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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent• 
vs. 
CHARLENE ANN HOLMES, 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
Case No. 880168-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION & NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of a conviction of a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
and 58-37-8(7) (1986)(amended 1988). This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal from the district court under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(s) (1987) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the initial stop of the car in which 
Defendant was riding was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
2. Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
retrieve the roll of towels Defendant tried to hide. 
3. Whether the standard for picking up and inspecting 
evidence in plain view should be reasonable suspicion. 
4. Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
pick up and inspect the evidence. 
5. Whether the "totality, of the circumstances" test 
is the appropriate standard for determining whether reasonable 
suspicion to stop and detain a person exists. 
STATE PROVISION 
The State relies in this brief on the following 
statutory provision: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop any person 
in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann § 58-77-8 (2)(a)(i)(1986)(amended 1988). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence which was 
heard on November 20, 1987 in the Third Judicial District Court, 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. The motion was denied 
on November 24, 1987. Defendant appeared before Judge Sawaya on 
January 15, 1988 and the State filed an Information amending the 
charge to Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of §§ 58-37-8 
(2)(a)(i) and 58-37-8(7) (1986) (amended 1988). Defendant 
submitted the case on the evidence heard at the suppression 
hearing and Defendant was convicted of the amended charge. 
On February 12, 1988, defendant was sentenced to 12 
months in the Salt Lake County Jail. The sentence was stayed & 
defendant was placed on probation with certain conditions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 17, 1987, at approximately 8:45 p.m. 
Sergeant Shelton and Lieutenant Gray of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department were driving southbound on State Street in Salt Lake 
City (R. 39 at 4-5 and 8). Sergeant Shelton had been a police 
officer for fourteen years and had worked in vice enforcement for 
four years. He had also received additional training in vice 
enforcement (R-39 at 4). Lieutenant Gray had been a police 
officer for twenty years and was in charge of special 
investigations (R-39 at 25). The officers were patrolling that 
area because of the high rate of prostitution and crime in the 
area of 800 South to 2100 South State. (R.39 at 5). 
On that date, Sergeant Shelton saw defendant standing 
on a sidewalk speaking to the driver of a truck which had pulled 
across the sidewalk facing into a parking lot at approximately 
1100 South State (R. 39 at 5). Sergeant Shelton pulled in behind 
the truck and defendant broke off contact with the truck (R-39 at 
5-6). When defendant left the truck she slowly walked south, 
strolling and looking back toward traffic (R. 39 at 6, 13 and 
21). 
Less than a block later, defendant stopped and talked 
to the driver of another car for a brief moment (R.39 at 6-7). 
She left that car then continued south and crossed the street. 
She stopped again about a block later and spoke to the driver of 
a third car for a moment (R. 39 at 7). At that point Sergeant 
Shelton decided to follow defendant because her actions were 
common for prostitutes in the area (R. 30 at 8). He articulated 
his reasons for following defendant at that point as: 
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1. area of high prostitution and crime rate (R.39 at 
5)-
2. his experience in vice enforcement (R. 39 at 4). 
3. defendant's strolling along State Street at an 
extremely slow pace (R.39 at 21) 
4. defendant looking back toward traffic (R.39 at 21). 
5. types of contact between defendant and vehicles 
(R.39 at 21) 
6. short, brief conversations between defendant and 
drivers (R.39 at 21) 
7. defendant's actions fit the normal scenario of 
prostitutes on State Street (R.30 at 8). 
As the officers observed defendant, she met again with 
the driver of the second car and got into that vehicle (R.39 at 
8). They followed the car four blocks to 1700 South State and 
then east on 1700 South. The car pulled into one of the parking 
lots at South High while the officers drove on, then made a U-
turn. As the officers returned westbound, the car immediately 
drove out of the parking lot within only a few seconds of pulling 
in. By that time the officers were in front of the car westbound 
on 1700 South (R.39 at 9). The car next turned into another 
South High parking lot and the officers made another U-turn (R.39 
at 9-10). Again the car was in the parking lot only a few 
seconds before driving out again. There was no other activity at 
South High that evening to justify the car puling into the 
parking lot. (R.39 at 10). 
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At this point the officers suspected that defendant and 
the driver of the car had made a prostitution deal but had 
realized that the officers were following them and defendant was 
being taken back to where she was picked up. The officers then 
stopped the vehicle (R.39 at 10). An additional fact justifying 
the stop was the evasive action taken by the driver of the car. 
Sergeant Shelton approached the car and spoke with the driver 
(R.39 at 11). 
As Sergeant Shelton spoke with the driver, Lieutenant 
Gray approached the passenger door of the car (R.39 at 29). As 
Lieutenant Gray approached defendant in the passenger seat, he 
saw her look back toward Sergeant Shelton and the driver, then 
move her purse from her lap to the floor of the car. She then 
removed a roll of paper towels from her purse and tried to stuff 
them down between the seat of the car and the console. 
Lieutenant Gray opened the door and asked for the towels and 
defendant said that they weren't hers (R.39 at 30). Lieutenant 
Gray reached in and took the towels and unrolled them on the roof 
of the car. In the towels he found two syringes, a spoon and two 
packets of mayonnaise (R.39 at 31). The syringes evidently 
contained cocaine although the record is not clear on that point. 
Defendant was arrested for possession of controlled 
substance and said at the jail that the cocaine was not hers. 
She was not charged with prostitution nor was the driver arrested 
for solicitation (R.39 at 32). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should accord the trial court's decision on 
the motion to suppress evidence and the court's verdict a 
presumption of correctness. 
The initial stop of the car containing defendant was 
not capricious but based on articulable facts which justified the 
minimal intrusion of approaching defendant to ask for 
identification and explanation. 
The actions of defendant as the officer approached her 
gave him additional articulable facts to justify a detention of 
defendant and the retrieving of the towels defendant was trying 
to hide. That reasonable suspicion that the towels contained 
evidence allowed the officer to unroll the towels and find the 
syringes containing apparent contraband. 
The syringes with apparent contraband found in the 
towels gave the officer probable cause to seize the towels and 
the syringes and to arrest defendant. 
The "totality of the circumstances" test for 
determining reasonable suspicion for a stop and detention of 
defendant is the appropriate standard under the Utah Constitution 
as well as the United States Constitution. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT SHOULD 
BE ACCORDED A PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS. 
In this case the trial court took evidence at a hearing 
on defendant's Motion to Suppress then denied the motion. This 
Court should accord that decision a presumption of correctness as 
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it analyzes this case. See State v. Criscola, 444 P.2d 517, 519 
(Utah 1968), this Court should not overturn the trial court's 
decision unless there is clear error. See State v. Galleqos, 712 
P.2d 207, 208-209 (Utah 1985). 
Because of the trial court's position to hear the 
evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, this Court ought 
to give deference to that court's verdict. See State v. 
Ballenberqer 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982). 
POINT II. 
THE INITIAL STOP OF THE VEHICLE WITHIN WHICH 
DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER WAS NOT A DETENTION 
OF DEFENDANT. 
Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a man 
whose name is not given in the record. Respondent maintains that 
the stop of that vehicle was based on articulable facts as 
addressed in Point III of this Argument. Even after the vehicle 
was stopped the defendant was not detained until the officer who 
approached her observed her attempt to hide the roll of towels 
and asked to see the towels. Defendant's actions gave the 
officer reasonable suspicion to pick up and inspect the towels as 
discussed in Point IV of this Argument. 
The mere approaching of a person by a police officer 
does not automatically activate a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
Courts have consistently held that there are different levels of 
police contact with citizens. The Utah Supreme court in State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), cites with approval the Fifth 
Circuit Court's levels of police encounters in United States v. 
Merritt, 736 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1984): 
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(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime (sic) and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an 
officer may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 736 
F.2d at 230 (citation omitted). 
739 P.2d at 617-618 
In the present case, the officers waved over the car 
carrying defendant. The driver exited the car and spoke with 
Sergeant Shelton. Lieutenant Gray walked up to the passenger door 
and saw defendant's furtive movements as he approached defendant. 
Defendant had not been detained at that point, the officer was 
merely approaching her. Her actions then gave the officer 
reasonable suspicion to pick up and inspect the roll of towels 
defendant had attempted to hide as is discussed later in this 
brief. 
The issue at this point becomes whether an officer may 
approach a passenger of a lawfully stopped (See Point III) vehicle 
to ascertain her identity and request information about her 
activities which appear to be suspicious. 
The United State Supreme Court's opinion in 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), is instructive. 
There, the Court held that a peace officer may request the driver 
of a vehicle, stopped for a mere traffic violation, to step out of 
the vehicle with no indication of other unlawful activity 
whatever. The Court characterized the intrusion as "de minimus", 
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as "at most a mere inconvenience", and as one which "hardly rises 
to the level of a 'petty indignity'" 434 U.S. at 111. The Court 
held that a generalized concern for the officer's own safety, 
arising from the percentage of police shootings that occurred when 
an officer approached a suspect seated in a vehicle, without any 
evidence of danger in the particular case, was sufficient to 
justify requiring every driver stopped for a traffic violation to 
get out of the car. 
Some state courts have applied the Mimms analysis to 
cases similar to this one. In State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 
(Minn. 1978), police officers stopped a car which they observed 
driving the wrong way in their lane of traffic on a divided 
highway shortly after they had received a radio report of a 
robbery in the area. Nothing was known by the officers that 
connected this car to the robbery. The driver stepped out of the 
stopped car and met one of the officers halfway between the two 
vehicles. When the driver was unable to produce identification, 
the officer walked up to the passenger side of the car to talk to 
the passenger. Unable to see inside the car, the officer opened 
the car door and, upon doing so, saw a gun which he grabbed. He 
then removed the passenger and patted him down. The Ferrise court 
reasoned: 
"If an officer orders a driver to get 
out of his car, as in Mimms, what he in 
effect is doing is also ordering the driver 
to open the door, because that is generally 
the only reasonable way a person can get out 
of a car. Operationally then, there is 
little practical difference between ordering 
a driver to open his door and get out of his 
car, on the one hand, and opening the door 
for the driver and telling him to get out, 
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on the other. In this case, if the driver 
had not gotten out of the car on his own, 
the officer could have opened the door and 
told him to get out. 
While the Mimms case involved only the 
right to order a driver to get out of the 
car, the Mimms analysis would seem also to 
justify a policy of ordering passengers out. 
The same concern of the officers for their 
own safety applies, and the intrusion on the 
rights of the passengers occasioned by being 
required to get out of the car is no greater 
than the intrusion on the rights of the 
driver. 
[3] In this case, the officer who 
opened the door and told the passenger to 
get out did not testify that he did this 
pursuant to any policy or out of any concern 
for his own safety. The officer, however, 
had a good reason for going back to the car 
and talking to the passenger. Specifically, 
he wanted to see if the passenger could aid 
them in accurately identifying the driver so 
a license check could be made. Since the 
car was covered with snow and the officer 
could not see the passenger, the officer 
simply opened the door. While he probably 
could have tapped on the window to get the 
passenger's attention, we fail to see how 
this action in opening the door in order to 
talk with the passenger could be deemed 
unreasonable, especially when under the 
Mimms holding he probably could have done so 
whether or not he had a particular reason 
for wanting to talk to the passenger. 
We hold that the intrusion into the 
passenger's privacy was minimal and that it 
may not prevail when balanced against the 
important public interests involved. The 
test is the reasonableness of the intrusion 
under all the circumstances, and in this 
case the minimal intrusion was completely 
reasonable and proper." 
269 N.W.2d at 890-91. 
Similarly, Lieutenant Gray had good reason to approach 
defendant and ask for identification and investigate her actions 
on State Street. As Lieutenant Gray approached he observed 
defendant's activities which increased his suspicious. 
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In State v. Trujillo, 749 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
this Court addressed the issue of when, during the police 
encounter, a seizure occurs. In that case, Trujillo and others 
were walking slowly down the street, peering into windows at 3:30 
a.m. An officer approached them and asked for identification. No 
one tried to flee and all three gave the officer their correct 
names. They explained that they were going to Trujillo's cousin's 
house. The officer frisked Trujillo and found a knife strapped to 
his chest. This Court began by determining if and when Trujillo 
had been seized. The Court said: 
" A seizure within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment occurs only when the 
officer by means of physical force or 
show of authority has in some way 
restricted the liberty of a person. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 
at 1876 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 
n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, n.16). When a 
reasonable person, based on the totality 
of the circumstances, remains, not in 
the spirit of cooperation with the 
officer's investigation, but because he 
believes he is not free to leave a 
seizure occurs. Id. at 544, 555, 100 
S.Ct. at 1870, 1877." 
739 P.2d at 87 (footnote omitted) this Court further quoted the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Mendenhall in giving examples of 
circumstances amounting to seizure including drawn guns, presence 
of several officers, physical touching by police, and language or 
tone of voice compelling compliance by the citizen. 739 P.2d at 
87. 
In the Trujillo case this Court found insufficient 
information in the record to determine whether a seizure occurred 
prior to the pat-down search of Trujillo so it "assumed[d] that up 
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to that point no intrusion upon Trujillo's constitutionally 
protected rights occurred." 739 P.2d at 88. However, the Court 
did find a seizure when the officer took hold of Trujillo and 
patted him down. 
Even under Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1978) and 
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983), the initial stop of the 
defendant in the present case was not a seizure. Both of those 
cases speak of the stopping of the automobile and the detention of 
the occupant. The stopping of the automobile, by itself, is not a 
seizure. Just as in the Trujillo case, there must be an 
additional step of detaining the occupant before a seizure occurs. 
Respondent agrees that defendant was eventually 
detained and seized but that seizure did not occur at the initial 
stop of the car and approach by Lieutenant Gray. The seizure 
occurred after Lieutenant Gray saw defendant try to hide the roll 
of towels and then disclaim ownership of the towels. By then, 
Lieutenant Gray had reasonable suspicion to retrieve the towels 
and unroll them based on defendant's actions. Lieutenant Gray 
also had at least reasonable suspicion at that point to detain 
defendant until the suspicious actions were explained. 
POINT III. 
THE OFFICERS HAD ARTICULABLE FACTS ALLOWING 
THEM TO STOP THE CAR AND APPROACH DEFENDANT 
BEFORE HER FURTHER ACTIONS GAVE THEM CAUSE TO 
DETAIN HER. 
Analysis of the stop of the car must be separate from 
analysis of the detention of defendant because of the different 
levels of police encounter as cited in Deitman and Merritt. The 
officers articulated specific facts for wanting to stop the 
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vehicle containing defendant and for suspecting criminal behavior 
(R.39 at 21-22), Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) and State v. 
Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), reinforce the concept that an 
officer needs reasonable suspicion, not a mere hunch, to detain a 
person. The United States Supreme Court has said that an officer 
may look at the facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion in light 
of his experience. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), that 
Court found that the officer was unable to point to any facts that 
the situation was suspicious. In a footnote the Court said: 
This situation is to be distinguished from 
the observations of a trained, experienced 
police officer who is able to perceive and 
articulate meaning in given conduct which 
would be wholly innocent to the untrained 
observer. 
443 U.S. at 52 (footnote 2)(citation omitted). That Court had 
earlier said: 
In all situations the officer is entitled to 
assess the facts in light of his experience 
in detecting illegal entry and smuggling. 
U.S v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,885 (1975). 
In the present case the officers were able to 
articulate specific facts which caused them to be suspicious of 
defendant and her companion. Both officers had been peace 
officers for many years and both worked in the Vice Squad (R. 39 
at 4 and 25). Sergeant Shelton had attended additional training 
in relation to vice enforcement (R. 39 at 4). The officers knew 
that the area between 800 South and 2100 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, had a high incident rate of prostitution and other 
crime (R.39 at 5). They were familiar with the normal scenario 
for prostitution in the area (R.39 at 6). 
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The officers saw defendant walking slowly south on 
State Street (R. 39 at 5 to 7) and noted that her walking pace was 
consistent with prostitution. She was strolling very slowly and 
looking back toward traffic (R. 39 at 21). She spoke to drivers 
in three different cars and then got in the second car when it 
approached her the second time (R. 39 at 8). This carf with 
defendant in it, went south another four blocks then turned into 
the South High School parking lot even though there was no 
activity there that evening (R. 39 at 9-10). When the officers 
turned back to South High the car left the parking lot after 
having been in the lot for only seconds (R.39 at 9). As the 
officers watched, the car turned into the second parking lot and 
again stayed only seconds before entering the street again (R.39 
at 10). Based on the defendant's activity when walking on the 
street and then the apparently evasive driving of the car, the 
officers had developed articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
and an attempt to avoid officers that validated their stop of the 
vehicle. 
The cases cited by defendant in asking this Court to 
reverse defendant's conviction are distinguishable from the 
present case. In State v. Trulillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), this Court said that in the totality of the circumstances 
the seizure of Trujillo was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
The stop in Trujillo was based on the late hour and the high crime 
factor. This Court found that the officer had not articulated any 
activity by Trujillo that was suspicious enough to warrant the 
officer actually seizing and patting down Trujillo. 
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In the present case, the officers did articulate 
factors beyond the high-prostitution-area factor. Defendant was 
walking slowly and looking back toward traffic. She stopped to 
speak to three different vehicles four different times in 
approximately a two-block area. The second car returned and 
picked her up then appeared to take evasive action when the 
officers followed them. That gave articulable suspicion for the 
initial stop of the car defendant was in. 
The actual seizure or detaining of defendant occurred 
after the additional suspicious activity by defendant of trying to 
hide a roll of towels taken out of her purse (R.39 at 30). She 
tried to stuff the towels between the seat and the console then 
disclaimed ownership (R.39 at 30). Those additional factors 
increased the reasonable suspicion on the officer's part to detain 
defendant and check the towels. 
In State v. Carpena# 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the only 
factors the officer used to stop and detain Carpena were the late 
hourf slow moving car, out of state license plates, and past 
burglaries in the area. The Utah Supreme Court found those to be 
insufficient in that case. The officers in the present case had 
observed additional suspicious activities on the part of defendant 
which were not consistent with an innocent walk or drive on State 
Street. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Whittenback# 621 P.2d 
103 (Utah 1980), affirmed that defendant's conviction when the 
Court found reasonable suspicion in the totality of the 
circumstances for the stop. The previous contact between 
Whittenback and the officer was only one factor to look at in 
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making that determination. The fact that previous contact between 
defendant and the officers in the present case is not in the 
record does not diminish the strength of the other circumstances 
pointing to articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Cases in which a "courier profile" was used to stop 
vehicles and search cars do not apply to the present case. 
Defendant was not stopped solely because of where she was or how 
she was dressed or how she wore her hair or her ethnic appearance. 
Most of those factors were not even mentioned in the evidence. 
The car in which she was riding was stopped because of defendant's 
activities on State Street and the car's evasive actions. 
Defendant was further detained because of her concealment 
activities as Lieutenant Gray approached her side of the car. 
The totality of the evidence presented in the record 
establishes that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the 
car and to further detain defendant when she tried to hide the 
towels taken from her purse. 
POINT IV. 
THE INSPECTION OF THE ROLL OF TOWELS AND ITS 
SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE WERE PROPER 
Defendant maintains that the retrieving and unrolling 
of the paper towels was unlawful. The recent line of Utah cases 
dealing with "plain view" seizures validates the inspection and 
subsequent seizure of the towels in this case. The Court in State 
v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985), quoted State v. Romero, 660 
P.2d 715 (Utah 1983) as it held: 
"Thus, a warrantless seizure or 
property in plain view after a lawful 
intrusion is justified if: "(1) the 
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officer is lawfully present where the 
search and seizure occur; (2) the 
evidence is in plain view; and (3) the 
evidence is clearly incriminating.M 
712 P.2d at 210 (footnote omitted). In that case, officers were 
lawfully present and the VCR was in plain view but nothing about 
the VCR made it clearly incriminating. There were no attempts by 
defendant to hide it. 
In State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme court cited Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983)(plurality 
opinion), and said: 
The opinion expresses concern, however, 
with the implication of the requirement 
that the incriminating nature of the item 
to be seized be "immediately apparent." 
"[T]he use of the phrase 'immediately 
apparent' was very likely a very unhappy 
choice of words, since it can be taken to 
imply that an unduly high degree of 
certainty as to the incriminatory 
character of evidence is necessary for an 
application of the 'plain view 
doctrine.'" Ld. at 741, 103 S. Ct. at 
1542. The Court therefore reaffirmed the 
rule that all that is required is that 
there be "'probable cause to associate 
the property with criminal activity.'" 
Id. at 741-42,103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 
100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 
(1980)). Under that standard, an officer 
must only have a reasonable belief "that 
certain items may be contraband or stolen 
property or useful as evidence of a 
crime; it does not demand any showing 
that such a belief be correct..." A 
'practical, nontechnical' probability 
that incriminating evidence is involved 
is all that is required." Brown, 460 
U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting 
Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 
(1949))." 
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718 P.2d at 390. The Utah Supreme Court quotes the "probable 
cause" language of Texas v. Brown but then says that the officer 
"must only have reasonable belief" that the item is contraband. 
Id. This left confusion as to the standard in Utah as to whether 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause is necessary in 
determining the incriminating nature of the item in plain view. 
Respondent maintains that the officers' actions in the 
present case were justified under either standard* The officer 
was outside of the car where he had a lawful right to be; he saw 
the roll of towels in plain view as defendant took them out of her 
purse; defendant's actions in trying to hide the towels gave the 
officer probable cause to associate them with criminal activity. 
Lieutenant Gray testified that defendant's purse was initially on 
her lap as he approached the car, then she put it down on the 
floor. She then took the roll of towels out of her purse and 
tried to stuff them between the car seat and the console. The 
officer opened the door and asked for the roll and defendant said 
that they were not hers (R.39 at 30). If one could believe 
defendant's statement at that point one could argue that defendant 
does not have standing to challenge the seizure of the towels. 
When defendant disclaimed ownership of the towels, 
officer seized them and unrolled them and found syringes with 
cocaine in them (R.39 at 31). Defendant's attempt to hide the 
towels and to disclaim ownership when she had removed them from 
her purse gave the officer reason to believe that the towels were 
evidence of criminal evidence. Had the towels just been sitting 
there and no attempt made to hide them, they would not have been 
clearly incriminating. 
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The picking up and unwrapping of the towels was a 
minimal intrusion. Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed 
the issue of picking up an object in plain view to examine it. 
While it is impossible to reconcile all of the 
decisions on this point, many of which do not 
articulate a clear rationale, most of the cases can be 
explained as follows: The minimal additional intrusion 
which results from an inspection or examination of an 
object in plain view is reasonable if the officer was 
first aware of some facts and circumstances which 
justify a reasonable suspicion (not probable cause, in 
the traditional sense) that the object is or contains a 
fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of crime. 
2 W. La Fave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, § 6.7(b), 717 (2d ed. 1987). 
Respondent urges this Court to rule that the officer 
needed only reasonable suspicion to pick up and unwrap the towels. 
The officer had reasonable suspicion at the very least when he saw 
defendant take the towels out of her purse, try to hide them and 
then disclaim ownership. Once the towels were unwrapped and the 
syringes exposed, the officer had probable cause to seize the 
towels and syringes and to arrest defendant. 
Respondent suggests that there were different levels of 
police encounter with defendant in this case which should be 
analyzed under different standards. The initial stop of the car 
was analogous to an officer walking up to someone on the street 
and asking for identification. The officers here were able to 
articulate reasons for wanting to approach defendant but 
respondent maintains that the initial stop did not require the 
same level of suspicion that a detention of defendant requires. 
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After this initial stop, Lieutenant Gray saw further 
activity by defendant which raised the level of suspicion and 
justified the actions of Lieutenant Gray in picking up and 
unrolling the towels. By that time, the towels, which were in 
plain view, had become clearly incriminating when defendant tried 
to hide them and disclaim ownership. 
Finally, Lieutenant Gray had probable cause to seize 
the towels when he unrolled them and found the syringes. At that 
point the towels were clearly evidence of an attempt to hide the 
syringes which contained contraband. 
POINT V 
THE TEST FOR DETERMINING REASONABLE SUSPICION 
IS AN APPROPRIATE TEST OF THE LAWFULNESS OF 
THIS STOP UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AS WELL 
AS THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Defendant asks this Court to fashion some new, more 
rigorous standard for determining the meaning of reasonable 
suspicion in this case but does not give the court any assistance 
as to what this new standard should be. By its nature the 
statutory reasonable suspicion standard requires a case-by-case 
analysis of the facts. The Court must find in the evidence before 
it "specific, articulable facts which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime." Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. The very nature of this 
analysis defies a "bright-line" standard. Defendant has not given 
this Court a suggested test for determining reasonable suspicion 
beyond the present one because there is none. The courts must 
make that determination based on a review of the facts in each 
case. 
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Defendant's argument for a different standard under the 
Utah Constitution is based on dicta in recent Utah Supreme court 
cases. See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) and State v. 
Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Uah 1985) (Zimerman, J., concurring). 
In a recent case the Utah Supreme court declined to draw a 
distinction between the provisions against unreasonable search and 
seizure found in the United States and the Utah constitutions. In 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), the Court said: 
"Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution reads nearly verbatim 
with the fourth amendment, and thus 
this court has never drawn any 
distinctions between the protections 
afforded by the respective 
consitutional provisions. Rather, the 
court has always considered the 
protections afforded to be one and the 
same. We do not depart from the view 
in this case, and hold that 
unreasonable private searches are not 
subject to the protection of article 
I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution.H 
750 P.2d at 1221 (footnotes omitted). 
Respondent maintains that there is no reason in the 
present case for this Court to formulate a different test under 
the Utah Constitution. The "totality of the circumstances" test 
for determining reasonable suspicion has been used consistently by 
the Utah courts as well as Federal courts and is the appropriate 
test for this case. See also State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 
Court Appeals 1988), wherein this Court applied the "totality of 
the circumstances" test. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the State requests this Court to 
affirm the trial court's conviction of defendant. 
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